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The international market for large commercial jet aircraft is about as 
far as one can get from the standard trade theory paradigm  of static 
constant returns and price-taking competition. It is an industry in which 
the survival of firms depends on periodic introduction of new families 
of aircraft, and the introduction of a new family is marked by massive 
dynamic scale economies. A huge initial expenditure on development 
is followed by a steep learning curve at the level of the firm, a curve 
that industry experts believe lasts throughout the product cycle. The 
fixed cost and the dynamic increasing returns introduced by learning 
ensures that this is an industry in which only a few firms can profitably 
exist. In the world market there are only three significant manufacturers 
of airframes for jets that seat more than one hundred passengers. It is 
arguable that in the absence of government support there would  be 
only one. 
For those who work on the “new”  trade theory that emphasizes 
increasing returns, dynamics, and imperfect competition, these eco- 
nomic characteristics would in and of themselves make aircraft a nat- 
ural target for study. An additional reason for interest in the aircraft 
industry, however, is that the industry is the center of a policy conflict 
between the United States and Europe. Aircraft  production is widely 
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regarded  as a “strategic”  industry  and has long been a target of in- 
dustrial policy in Europe. In the late 1970s this policy for the first time 
achieved some commercial  success, when  Airbus  Industrie, a four- 
nation  European consortium, began  to achieve a  significant market 
share with  its A300 family  of large,  medium-range jets. Since then, 
accusations have flown and tension has risen. 
The U.S. dominance of the world aircraft industry is one of the few 
remnants of the United States’ vanishing technological  superiority, so 
a challenge in this area is particularly  irksome. Both U.S. manufac- 
turers and  U.S. government officials  have  charged  that Airbus  has 
bought market share only with the help of government subsidy. On the 
other side, the Europeans deny that the government loans supporting 
Airbus represent a subsidy; they argue that the governments expect to 
be repaid  in full, and they charge in  return that U.S. manufacturers 
receive de facto support from military procurement. 
This chapter takes a preliminary look at international competition in 
the market for large commercial jet aircraft, viewing the competition 
in terms of the recent style of trade modeling that emphasizes imperfect 
competition  and  increasing returns. We  develop a simulation model 
that roughly  reproduces the conflict between the United  States and 
Europe in medium-range, wide-bodied transports. The focus is on two 
questions: How large is the effective European subsidy, and what have 
been the welfare effects of this subsidy on the United States, Europe, 
and the rest of the world? 
The chapter is in six sections. Section 3.1 presents some background 
on the industry. Section 3.2 presents a preliminary analytic overview 
of the welfare issues raised by European targeting. Section 3.3 lays out 
the analytics of the simulation model; section 3.4 then describes the 
calibration of the model to data and its solution.  Finally,  section 3.5 
discusses the conclusions and possible future work. 
3.1  Technology, Competition, and Cost 
The production  of aircraft is a technology-intensive  industry. That 
is, relative to other products, a large part of the cost of producing an 
airplane is the cost of creating the technology embodied in  its design 
and manufacturing. This cost is incurred both directly, in the form of 
research and development (R&D) expenses, and indirectly, by the ac- 
ceptance of losses during the initial phase of the learning curve in the 
expectation that costs will fall with experience. 
Like other technology-intensive industries, aircraft is characterized 
by a distinct product cycle. At intervals, fundamental breakthroughs 
in design are made, and manufacturers introduce new families of air- 47  Industrial Policy and International Competition 
craft to take advantage of these breakthroughs. In between, production 
costs are reduced through experience, and relatively minor modifica- 
tions of existing aircraft are undertaken to suit them more precisely to 
market demand. 
Table 3.1 shows the deliveries of large passenger aircraft by manu- 
facturers since the introduction of the first commercially viable jets in 
the late 19.50s. The product cycle is clear-cut. In the late 19.50s,  turbofan 
jets, the Boeing 707, and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-8 were introduced 
and remained  strong sellers until the early  1970s. In the mid-l960s, 
somewhat larger aircraft,  the  roughly  1.50-seat 727 and  DC-9,  were 
introduced. At the end of the 1960s came the “jumbo jets,” wide-bodied 
aircraft (two aisles)-the  Boeing 747 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC- 
10. Finally, at the end of the  1970s came wide-bodied medium-range 
jets, the Airbus A300 and the Boeing 767. 
The important point is that in contrast to other technology-intensive 
industries, such as semiconductors, the product cycles in aircraft are 
quite long. A few 707s are still being produced for military use. While 
such a long product life is exceptional, the life of a successful airframe 
is  something like twenty years. The counterpart is that each time a 
new generation is being developed, companies must essentially stake 
their survival on a successful design. 
Once an aircraft has been developed, average cost falls steeply as 
cumulative production mounts, both because the R&D can be spread 
over a larger base and because production costs fall with the learning 
curve. Figure 3.1 presents estimates of costs for the hypothetical new 
aircraft, as calculated by  the U.S. Commerce Department in cooper- 
ation with McDonnell-Douglas. 
3.1.1  Demand and Competition 
Aircraft  are capital goods that  are one of  several inputs into the 
production of passenger service. The existence of different air routes 
creates a demand for aircraft with different characteristics and thereby 
supports a limited Lancasterian differentiation among aircraft. To min- 
imize costs, airlines typically own a mixture of  airplanes. Currently 
there are fourteen types of  large turbojets operating in the world air 
carrier fleet. 
The composition of  the mix  depends primarily on the types of air 
routes the airline flies. Due to both physical and organizational con- 
siderations, a plane will  have lower operating costs per passenger the 
larger it is (because large planes are more fuel-efficient per seat but 
still need only the same size cockpit crew) and the shorter the planned 
range (because less space and weight are allocated to fuel storage). 
Nonetheless, certain routes require long-range planes and some routes 48  Richard Baldwin/Paul Krugman 
Table 3.1  Deliveries of Large Passenger Aircraft 
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Subtotal  7  37  59  53  48  25  50  74  82  53  60  71  45 
Total  15  135  255  209  170  100  207  284  401  523  741  569  334 
are more cheaply serviced by small planes that fly full than by large, 
half-empty planes.  Thus roughly speaking, aircraft are differentiated 
in a two-dimensional space of range versus number of passengers. 
Table 3.2 presents some characteristics of wide-body aircraftwow in 
production. The main point to notice in the table is that not all wide- 
bodied aircraft are close substitutes. The four-engine Boeing 747 is a 
monster compared with the other aircraft, both in terms of size and 
range; essentially there is nothing else like it. The three-engine DC-10 
is considerably smaller and shorter-range; it is also at this point almost 
out of production (see below). Still smaller and shorter-range are the 49  Industrial Policy and International Competition 
Table 3.1  (continued) 
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A300  and the Boeing  767.  It is  between these two planes that the 
effective U.S.-European competition has taken place. Thus we do not 
look at aircraft as an aggregate and count 747s as part of the U.S. 
market share. On the demand side, the close substitution is between 
the 767 and the A300. 
3.1.2  Government Policy and the State of Competition 
At the beginning of the 1970s there were three major U.S. civilian 
aircraft  manufacturers: Boeing,  McDonnell-Douglas,  and Lockheed. 
Competitive pressure, however, narrowed the field. McDonnell-Douglas 50  Richard BaldwidPaul Krugman 
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Fig. 3.1  Development and  production costs,  hypothetical  150-seat 
transport. Notes: A is Total Average Cost = ([Cumulative 
Production Cost] + [Development Cost])/Number  of Units; 
B  is  Cumulative  Average  Production  Cost  =  Cumulative 
Production Cost/Number of Units; C is Individual Unit Pro- 
duction Cost, calculated using the following learning curves 
developed in cooperation with  Douglas Aircraft company: 
units  1-10,  71.4 percent; units  11-20,  76.3  percent; units 
21-50,  78.2 percent; and units 51 or greater, 81.1 percent. 
Source: Office of Competitive Assessment. 
and Lockheed both introduced three-engine wide-bodied jets (the DC- 
10 and the L-1011) that were close substitutes in a market that appar- 
ently was not large enough to support two firms. The result was that 
both suffered serious losses. Lockheed withdrew from civilian manu- 
facturing altogether.  McDonnell-Douglas basically  exited the market 
for wide-bodied aircraft, although it continues to sell substantial num- 
bers of narrow-bodied MD-80s. The production of  the DC-10 was ac- 
tually stopped in 1984; then the company restarted the production line 
on a limited basis because it can also sell a military version of the same 
aircraft. If  it were not for the presence of Airbus, the manufacture of 
wide-bodied  aircraft would be essentially a Boeing monopoly. 
Airbus was founded in 1970. After some reshuffling, it has ended as 
a consortium jointly owned by the governments of  France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and Spain. The mechanics of government support 
are complex, but in  essence Airbus is able to borrow money that it 
will repay only to the extent that the consortium is profitable. In other 51  Industrial Policy and International Competition 
Table 3.2  Characteristics of Wide-Bodied Aircraft 
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Source: Economist. June I. 1985 
words, it is able to finance its investment through what is nominally 
debt, but what closely resembles equity. 
The size of the subsidy provided to the A300 is a matter of dispute 
for the simple reason that it is not a directly measurable quantity. Airbus 
is currently producing the A300 and the A310.  It has also begun to 
invest in  research  and development  on the A320.  It has lost money 
consistently  since its founding. However, all new aircraft lose money 
at first-that  is the nature of a technology-intensive product, in which 
investment in knowledge is expensed and therefore appears as an ac- 
counting loss. The true test is  one of  future prospects: can Airbus 
reasonably be expected to yield a competitive market rate of  return? 
Boeing, not surprisingly, claims that it will not, that the development 
of the A300 would not have been undertaken under normal commercial 
evaluation of its prospects. European governments deny this and say 
that they expect to be fully repaid. Most observers agree with Boeing’s 
assessment, but not necessarily with the large estimates of the size of 
the implicit subsidy that Boeing has circulated. 
One important reason Airbus probably  would  not  have succeeded 
as a private project is that it has taken a long time to achieve significant 
commercial sales. As table 3.3 shows, the first deliveries of the A300 
took place in 1974, but it was not until 1979 that large sales were made. 
There followed  several  years of  large sales, which then fell off sub- 
stantially after Boeing introduced the 767. Table 3.3  Deliveries of Commercial Aircraft 
1969  '70  '71  '72  '73  '74  '75  '76  '77  '78  '79  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85 
A300  4  9  13  16  15  24  40  45  46  21  19  17 
767  20  55  29  25 
DClO  13  52  57  47  43  19  14  18  36  40  23  I1  4  2  n.a. 
747  4  92  69  30  30  22  21  27  20  32  67  73  58  25  23  16  24 
Source: Economist, June  1,  1985. 53  Industrial  Policy and International Competition 
3.2  Analytical Welfare Issues 
Although competition in the aircraft industry is dynamic in nature, 
some of the policy aspects can be illustrated with static models, Two 
models in particular are useful in thinking about the results we derive: 
a  simple model of subsidized entry of a monopolist,  and a similarly 
simple model of subsidized entry of a duopolist. 
As a first model for thinking about the effect of the Airbus program, 
let us disregard the competitive aspect. What would have happened if 
Airbus’s entry had simply been a subsidized entry of a monopolist into 
a market where no other firms would have produced? This is not entirely 
irrelevant as a description  of the situation. When the A300 was first 
introduced, it  did  not  face any closely  competitive aircraft:  it  was 
smaller and shorter-range than the U.S. wide-bodies, larger and cheaper 
to operate than U.S.  narrow-bodies. From 1979 to 1982, in particular, 
Airbus  was clearly filling a  market  niche  that made it  in  a  sense a 
monopolist. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the position of a monopolist subject to decreas- 
ing cost. D is the market demand curve, MR the associated marginal 
revenue curve, MC the marginal cost curve, and AC the average cost 
curve. P,  and  Q, are the profit-maximizing  price and quantity.  As 
drawn, the monopolist cannot enter profitably.  If  it were to enter, it 
would suffer losses equal to the shaded area. 
Suppose, now, that a government provides the monopolist  with  a 
subsidy sufficiently large to induce entry. Then the shaded area still 
represents a social loss. Against this, however, must be set the gain in 
consumer surplus. It is certainly possible that the gain might exceed 
the loss, so that privately unprofitable entry is socially beneficial. 
Where does international trade enter into this story? If there is an 
integrated world market, all that happens is that the gain in consumer 
surplus is divided among several countries. Thus if  one country sub- 
sidizes the entry of a monopolist into an otherwise unprofitable market, 
the effect will be a gain for all other countries, a possible gain for the 
world as a whole, and a possible gain for the subsidizing country. It is 
of course possible that the policy will be beneficial for the world as a 
whole but not for the subsidizing nation. 
Matters become more complex if there is already an incumbent firm. 
In that case, subsidizing entry will reduce the incumbent firm’s profits. 
If the existing firm is located in a different country from the new firm, 
the profit shifting can make subsidizing the entry a beggar-thy-neighbor 
policy. 
Much of the strategic trade policy literature has focused on the pos- 
sibility that a credible commitment by a government to subsidize entry 
will deter entry by foreign rivals. In this case entry may turn out to be 54  Richard Baldwin/Paul Krugman 
PR ICEl  \ 
SUBSIDY  COST 
CONSUMER  SURPLUS  GAIN 
Utl'll  I  I 
Qm  QUANTITY 
Fig. 3.2  Impact of  the subsidized entry of a monopolist 
profitable ex post, even though a firm operating without subsidy would 
not  have found it profitable. In the case of the A300,  however, it is 
clear that the Airbus subsidy did not succeed in keeping Boeing out of 
the market. (The Airbus entry into the 150-seat narrow-bodied market, 
the A320, may be a different story.) Thus the right model must be one 
in which entry leads to the formation of a duopoly, in  which the sub- 
sidized firm has negative profits. 
In assessing the effects of this entry, we need to consider first the 
effect on output and prices. Suppose that after entry, competition takes 
the form of Cournot quantity-setting. Then we can represent the com- 
petition by two firms' reaction functions, as  in figure 3.3. In the absence 
of a government subsidy, output will lie at point A. With a government 
subsidy, the equilibrium  will  shift to B, with  Airbus's  entry causing 





Fig. 3.3  Two possible equilibriums  in a Cournot game 
To assess the welfare effects in this case, we need to consider three 
regions:  Europe, the United  States, and the rest  of  the world.  The 
effects of the subsidized entry on Europe and the United States are 
illustrated in figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
In figure 3.4 we see the effect of  subsidized entry in  Europe. The 
world price is driven down from P,,  the monopoly price, to P2,  the 
duopoly price. This produces a gain in consumer surplus, illustrated 
by  the  shaded  area.  On  the  other hand,  by  assumption,  European 
production, at Q2,  takes place at an average cost that exceeds P2.  This 
leads to a loss that offsets the consumer gain. As in  the case of  mo- 
nopolistic entry, Europe may either gain or lose. 
In figure 3.5 we see the effect of Europe’s subsidy on the United 
States. The fall in the price from PI  to P, produces a consumer gain. 56  Richard BaldwidPaul Krugman 
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Fig. 3.4  Effect of Airbus entry on European  welfare 
But there is also a producer loss. This loss consists of two parts. First, 
at the initial output Q,, the fall in the price produces a loss. Second, 
the domestic firm is induced to reduce its output from Q,  to Q2.  Since 
even in the duopoly situation marginal cost is less than the price, this 
output reduction leads to a further loss in profits, also shown in the 
figure. 
In general, the welfare effect on the United  States is ambiguous. 
However, if  (as is realistic) the United States remains a net exporter 
even with subsidized European entry, the net effect is unambiguously 
negative. The reason is that the conventional terms-of-trade effect- 
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Impact of  Airbus entry on U.S. welfare 
remained  at Q,-is  clearly negative,  and to this must  be added any 
negative  “strategic”  effects, as captured by  the decline in  Q, even 
though price remains above marginal cost. 
The rest of  the world,  of  course, gains  unambiguously  from  the 
decline in the price. 
To  sum up, we see that in a duopoly situation in which the United 
States remains a net exporter, the effects of subsidized European entry 
would be unambiguously negative. Europe could gain, but not because 
the strategic deterrent effect of its subsidy enables it to capture rents; 
instead, the gains would come on the consumer side. 58  Richard Baldwin/Paul Krugman 
3.2.1  Putting the Model Together 
We  have sketched out two models.  In the first, Europe is seen as 
subsidizing the entry of a monopolist into a market where nobody would 
otherwise produce. This entry benefits everyone except possibly  Eu- 
rope. In the second model, Europe’s entry changes a U.S. monopoly 
into a duopoly. Provided that it is a net exporter even after European 
entry, the United States must be a net loser. Again Europe can either 
gain or lose. 
Now  in actual fact the situation created by Airbus’s entry can be 
viewed as having reproduced each of these situations in turn. When 
the A300 was first introduced, it did not face close substitutes; thus 
for several years it might make sense to view Airbus as a new product 
provided to the world. After 1982 the A300 shared the market with a 
fairly close substitute, the Boeing 767, of which the United States was 
a net  exporter. Thus the United  States was a net gainer during the 
early  years of  Airbus’s  presence, but was a net loser once its own 
entry into the market had taken place. The overall effect is ambiguous 
and depends on the relative weight given to the early period versus 
the later one. 
3.3  A Model of Aircraft Competition 
To produce a solvable model of competition in aircraft, we abstract 
from many real-world  complications.  We  focus entirely on the com- 
petition between the A300 and the 767, ignoring both the residual pres- 
ence of McDonnell-Douglas and the linkage between  competition  in 
this area  and other families of aircraft. Equally important, our treatment 
of the intertemporal substitutability  of aircraft is less than complete. 
The main  focus is  on the dynamics of  competition  that arise from 
learning by doing and the corresponding strategies of output over time. 
3.3.1  Setup of the Model 
Aircraft constitute large and lumpy purchases. Since airlines like to 
have compatible equipment, the usual aircraft sale involves dozens of 
planes. These planes will usually be built after the order, with the design 
modified somewhat to the buyer’s specifications. Furthermore, aircraft 
are durable goods. The typical airliner has a service life of twenty years. 
For these reasons it is typical for each airline to negotiate only once 
for each model. 
Aircraft are not consumed directly but rather constitute one of many 
inputs into the production  of air carrier service.  Airlines  purchase a 
variety of planes in order to service their air routes. As discussed above, 
the composition of a carrier’s fleet is chosen to minimize costs. Since 59  Industrial Policy and International Competition 
planes are durable goods, buying an additional A300 or 767 will  affect 
an airline’s profit via a cost-savings effect for the life of  the aircraft. 
In general, the derived demand for A300s and 767s would depend on 
the price of all large jets as well as the price of jet fuel, staff wages, 
and so forth. Appealing to tractability, we shall ignore these cross-price 
effects. 
This cost-saving effect of an additional A300 or 767 clearly depends 
only on the number of such jets in an air carrier’s own fleet. However, 
in principle the A300s and 767s delivered to other carriers would affect 
profits by increasing the total supply of  available passenger seats and 
therefore the equilibrium passenger fare. This effect, however, is di- 
luted  by  several  factors. The desired number of  passenger seats is 
determined chiefly by the air routes chosen by airlines. This later choice 
is in turn determined by a host of demand and cost factors. Aircraft 
constitute between a third and a tenth of the variable costs (this figure 
is very sensitive to the price of fuel) of operating an air route. Moreover, 
the stock of planes chosen is affected by the retirement of old aircraft 
as well as the purchases of  the dozen other types of  commercial jets 
currently in production. To simplify the dynamics we shall ignore this 
revenue  effect. We  shall assume that  an  airline’s evaluation of  the 
marginal benefits of  an A300 or 767 depends only on the number of 
them in its own fleet. 
Formally, we assume that air carriers choose the number of jets to 
maximize the discounted sum of profits, taking as given the aircraft’s 
price. If  the service life of the aircraft is N  years, the first-order con- 
dition of a typical airline (in the year it actually purchases planes) is 
N- 1  c [Rin’,+i(q)l = Pr  7 
i=O 
where q is the number of A300s or 767s it buys, R is the discount factor, 
pr is the price of  the  aircraft,  and  IIf,+i(q) is the derivative of  the 
purchaser’s profits in year t+  1 with respect to q.  The standard Kuhn- 
Tucker conditions hold for all other years (notice we have skirted the 
consideration that leads airlines to buy all at once rather than year by 
year). We  ignore the integer constraint and assume that the two models 
are perfect substitutes. Assuming for simplicity’s sake that “I”  airlines 
purchase each year, the market demand for the planes is 
p, = c Rib(x, + x,*)’lE ,  (1) 
where we have assumed a functional form for II:  = p(xl + x;)’/~,  and 
b equals pPE.  The deliveries of Boeing are denoted by x,  the deliveries 
of  Airbus by x*, and the demand elasticity by E. 
N- 1 
I  =o 60  Richard BaldwidPaul Krugman 
It is worthwhile to point out two features of this demand relation. 
First, it has the form of a standard, atemporal demand function with 
a constant elasticity equal to E. Second, the quantity sold today de- 
pends only on today’s price, as long as the airlines find it optimal to 
buy this year rather than next. This last modification will play an im- 
portant role below. 
Turning now to the producers, we assume there are two firms capable 
of producing a single good (medium-range wide-bodies). To  produce 
the good, each firm must incur a start-up cost F (paid in the first period). 
Thereafter,  the firms’ production costs decline with  experience ac- 
cording to the standard learning curve specification. Specifically, the 
direct marginal production costs of Boeing, c,  and Airbus, c*,  in period 
t are 
(2)  c, = h(K,)-g,  and c,* = h*(K:)-g, 
where K, and K; are cumulative production to date, and g is the elas- 
ticity of cost with respect to cumulative output. K,  and K; are related 
to x and x* by 
(3) 
To  define the objective function of the aircraft manufacturers,  we 
must address the choice of strategic variables. The standard choices 
are price and quantity. To  some extent Boeing and Airbus are selling 
differentiated products. This would in principle allow them to compete 
in  a Bertrand fashion, by setting a list price and selling to whoever 
wants  to buy at  those prices.  But  the circumstances of  the  market 
mitigate against this. Aircraft purchases are negotiated on an individual 
basis. These deals include financing, options for future orders, spare 
parts arrangements, and so forth. In the jargon of the industry, these 
“green stamps” alter the effective price in such a way that price-setting 
competition is not really feasible. More practically, to model Bertrand 
competition between two close, but not perfect, substitutes would re- 
quire an aggregate cross-price elasticity. To our knowledge such a figure 
does not exist in the industry literature. 
It is a long leap from arguing that price-setting competition is the 
wrong model to arguing that quantity setting is the right one. In actuality 
the strategic choice set of Boeing and Airbus probably contains price, 
quantity, and a wide variety of green stamps. Nonetheless, the Cournot 
assumption provides  a sensible  yet  simple way to model  imperfect 
competition. Given that we are treating the A300 and the 767 as one 
homogeneous product, Cournot is a better model than Bertrand. 
The objective of firms is to maximize their present value; these are 
defined as 
K, =  + x, ,  andK,*  = Kj-, + xT  . 61  Industrial Policy and International Competition 
T 
V =  -F  + 2 (P,  - ct)x,Rr,  and 
t=n 




where R and R* are the discount factors of the two firms. We  assume 
that the product cycle has a known length  T. After T periods a new 
technology arrives exogenously and makes this generation of aircraft 
obsolete. 
3.3.2  Profit-Maximizing Behavior 
This model is a standard Spence-type (1981) learning curve setup. 
The major decision that needs to  be taken is how sophisticated  to make 
the strategies of the players. In principle, each player should take into 
account the effect of  its current decisions on the future output of the 
other; that is, current output, because it  adds to a  firm's  stock of 
experience K, may have a valuable strategic effect in lowering future 
costs. However, we have chosen (which is perhaps a more realistic 
option as well) to assume that each firm takes the other's whole output 
time path as given. This means that the firms do not attempt to act 
strategically in a dynamic sense, but rather act as monopolists on the 
residual demand. 
In each period the U.S. firm faces a first-order condition of the form 
where the rightmost term represents the shadow value on experience, 
that is, the reduction in the present value of future costs that an ad- 
ditional unit of current output brings.  Let z, be this shadow value at 
time t;  then it is straightforward to show that z, obeys the difference 
equation 
This equation is tied down at one end by the condition that learning 
has no value in the last period: 
(7)  Zr = 0. 
An exactly parallel set of  relationships of course applies to the foreign 
firm. 
We turn next to the determination of output at a point in time. Equa- 
tion (5) may be rewritten as 
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In a Cournot duopoly with constant elasticity demand, once we have 
marginal costs, c,  + z,,  we can solve for both market shares and the 
price. In each period  c,  it can be shown that the market share of the 
European firm is 
1 -  m(l-l/E) 
s= 
(1/E)  (1 +m)  ’ 
where m is the ratio of (c, + z,)  to (cf  + z;). The market price, in turn, 
can be determined from the relationship 
(9) 
c,  + 2, 
1 -  ((I -s)/E)  * 
P, = 
From the demand curve (1) and the market share, we can then deter- 
mine x, and xf. 
Up to this point the durability of the good has had no formal role in 
the model. As noted above, the demand equation (1) is indistinguishable 
from a static demand function. A problem with the static formulation 
arises in trying to reproduce the historical situation. Since Boeing did 
not enter until 1982, Airbus had a monopoly from 1979 through  1981. 
With a static demand for aircraft, this quantum change in market struc- 
ture would lead the model to predict  a very large drop in the price 
between  1981 and 1982. However, since planes are capital goods, air 
carriers have some ability to shift their demand intertemporally.  It is 
therefore unlikely that any airline would purchase at the high, pre-1982 
price. 
If  an airline finds it more profitable to buy today rather than next 
year, it must be the case that 
This implies that the price cannot fall too fast. Specifically, 
(1  1)  Pr -  Pf+I 5  (1mw?)(1 --RN). 
This inequality restricts the rate at which the price falls. As it turns 
out, this constraint only binds during the Airbus monopoly period. 
3.3.3  Solution of  the Model 
Taylor method. We  used the following procedure. 
to solve for the corresponding sequence of K’s and K*’s. 
of marginal costs for Boeing and Airbus. 
This model can be solved iteratively, using what amounts to the Fair- 
1. An initial guess is made at the output path. These paths are used 
2. The K’s, K*’s,  x,’s,  and xf’s are used to construct the sequence 63  Industrial Policy and International Competition 
3. Given these sequences of marginal costs we can construct the 
market shares s,,  and  1  -s,,  the market price series p,, and therefore 
the time path of x and x*. 
4. This new series of x,’s and x,*’s are fed back into the loop. 
The whole process is repeated until it converges. The result is a path 
of  outputs that satisfies the first-order condition for both firms. 
3.4  Calibration and Results 
We have carried out a simulation of the model described above, with 
parameters and assumptions designed to resemble the actual compe- 
tition  between  Boeing and Airbus  in  medium-range jet aircraft.  We 
begin by describing the calibration procedure, the base case. Next we 
examine what our model predicts would have happened if  there had 
been no Airbus program. 
3.4.1  Calibration 
The first issue that  arises in  calibrating  the model to the aircraft 
industry is conceptual rather than quantitative: how to represent Eu- 
ropean industry policy.  As  we  pointed  out earlier, the governments 
backing Airbus  have provided  loans that could in  principle be  fully 
repaid, so they are not a simple subsidy. On the other hand, the loans 
will  be  repaid only to the extent of  Airbus’s profits.  Since it  seems 
clear that Airbus is willing to undertake projects that would not appear 
likely to earn market rates of return, we model the subsidy as equity 
participation by governments that expect less than the “market”  rate 
of  return. 
In an industry with a twenty-year product cycle and substantial learn- 
ing, the discount rate employed by a firm plays a significant role in the 
choice of  its output path. As part of  our modeling of the subsidy, we 
model the Airbus program as one that effectively lowers the discount 
rate of  the European firm to whatever it takes to make entry barely 
profitable (taking zero as a lower bound). This is conceptually equiv- 
alent to calculating the internal rate of return on the A300, and assuming 
that Airbus chose its output path using this discount rate. We  set the 
Boeing discount rate arbitrarily at 5 percent. 
Two parameters of  the model are assigned on the basis of industry 
estimates.  Following a  survey  in  the Economist (June 1,  1985),  we 
assume the learning curve has an elasticity of .2. That is, a 1 percent 
increase in cumulative production will decrease direct production costs 
by  .2 percent. From a Commerce Department study (Schlie 1986) we 
take the initial setup costs as $1.5 billion for both firms. 
The price elasticity for wide-bodied medium-range planes poses more 
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literature. Moreover, due to the nature of the market, the exact price 
of planes is difficult to ascertain and rarely reported. It was therefore 
impossible to directly estimate the elasticity ourselves. What we have 
done is to use the fact that the demand for commercial aircraft is a 
derived demand, together with the predictions of the whole model, to 
get a rough approximation of  the price elasticity. 
Using aggregate data on U.S.  air carriers we estimated the demand 
elasticity for commercial domestic passenger air service at 2.85. As- 
suming that aircraft account for a fifth of the marginal cost of providing 
air services, we can deduce that the derived demand elasticity for all 
aircraft is  .57. However, medium-range wide-bodied planes are only 
one of several types ofjets. Thus we should expect a cross-price effect 
in addition to the direct effect. That is, a one percent rise in the price 
of the A300 results in some substitution toward smaller or larger jets, 
as well as a rise in the marginal costs of  providing air services. We 
arbitrarily guess at a range for this cross-price elasticity. If we assume 
it is equal to 1.0, then E  = 1.57; if it equals 2.0, then E  = 2.57. 
There is an additional source of  inferences on E. The total profit- 
ability of  the  two firms depends  directly  on  E  (due to  the markup 
equation (9)). In simulations calibrated to an E much greater than 2.5, 
Boeing makes negative profits. Since by  all accounts, the 767 is fore- 
casted to be a profitable project, we focus on E's that are less than 
2.57. Similarly, simulations calibrated to much less than 1.57 imply an 
internal rate of return on the A300 in excess of  3.5 percent-and  thus 
might  have  been  a commercially  viable project.  Since most  studies 
forecast the A300  to have a low or negative rate of return, we limit 
ourselves to E's greater than 1.57. We  take E  = 2 as the central case. 
It is necessary to recognize somewhere the extra cost incurred by 
Airbus as a result of its slow development. We  approximate the cost 
by assuming that Airbus incurred its development cost in 1974 but was 
unable to deliver aircraft until 1979. Boeing, in contrast, is assumed to 
incur its development cost in the same year that 767 deliveries began, 
1982. Both planes are assumed to be sold until 1998. 
For  allocation  of  consumer  surplus to  regions,  it  is necessary  to 
allocate demand. Based on average numbers for the first half of  the 
1980s, we  allocate 41.5  percent  of  consumer  surplus to the  United 
States, 25.9 percent to Europe, and 32.6 percent  to the  rest of  the 
world. 
This still leaves us  with three free parameters-the  European dis- 
count rate and the constant terms in the two learning curves. We  carried 
out a search over parameter values, repeatedly solving the model, so 
as to choose the values for these parameters that meet the following 
conditions: nonpositive present value for Airbus; a 1984 price of  $50 
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Schlie 1986 and the Economist survey);  and a 1984 Airbus market share 
of 39.6 percent (also taken from the Economist). 
To line up the model on these values (for the central case of E = 2) 
required  that we set the intercept of the Airbus learning curve 17.2 
percent higher that of Boeing. In other words, with equal-length pro- 
duction runs, Airbus’s direct production  costs would be 17.2 percent 
higher than Boeing’s. 
3.4.2  The Base Case 
The upper part of table 3.4 shows the results of a solution of the 
model in the base case where the demand elasticity is taken as 2 and 
Airbus is given sufficient subsidy to enter the market. Notice that the 
price falls throughout the product life, but more rapidly  before  1982 
than after. If it were not for intertemporal substitution on the demand 
side, the price during the Airbus monopoly phase (1979-82)  would be 
near $100 million, falling to the $50 million range after Boeing’s entry. 
Clearly no airline would purchase a jet in  1981  when it knew that by 
waiting a year it could save $50 million. This consideration limits the 
price  Airbus  can charge  in  the first three years, as is described by 
equation (1 1). 
Once both planes  are in  the market,  the price  falls  very slowly. 
Despite the presence of substantial discounting by Boeing, the solution 
is quite close to the constant price path  that emerges from learning 
curve models with no discounting. The slow fall in prices is reassuring 
since nowhere in the industry literature is there a discussion of a sig- 
nificant price trend. Indeed  aircraft  industry  studies often assume a 
constant price in  evaluating the commercial prospects of a projected 
aircraft. 
The Airbus market share falls through time since it is learning at a 
lower rate than  Boeing. The total  deliveries  rise  slowly  as the true 
marginal cost falls. The simulation predicts total  sales of 398 planes 
for Airbus and 573 planes for Boeing. The figure for Airbus is a bit low 
compared with other projections,  but the Boeing figure is quite near 
the 600-700  range predicted for the Boeing 767. 
Table  3.4 also shows that for E  = 2, Airbus  is  simulated  to lose 
money even when it chooses an output path using a zero discount rate. 
Clearly,  Airbus’s entry depended on the existence of a  subsidy. To 
calculate the size of the subsidy we need to know the opportunity cost 
of public funds. Taking this number as 5 percent, the present value of 
the A300 earnings is a negative 1.471 billion 1974 dollars-a  large sum, 
although  not  on the  scale of  the $10-12  billion  number sometimes 
suggested by Boeing. 
Boeing’s 767, not surprisingly, has a positive present value of $1.02 
billion. Table 3.4  Simulation Results for the Central Case (E = 2.0) 
1979  '80  '81  '82  '83  '84  '85  '86  '87  '88  '89  '90  '91  '92  '93  '94  '95  '96  '97  '98 
BASE  CASE 
Prices  61  58  55  52  51 
Airbus  100  100  100  47  43 
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3.4.3  A World without Airbus 
The lower part of table 3.4 shows two scenarios for what would have 
happened, according to our model, if  there had been no government 
support of Airbus. The scenario at the bottom of table 3.4 (static de- 
mand formulation) simulates a Boeing monopoly where Boeing enters 
in  1982 and there is no intertemporal substitution of demand. That is, 
the demand curve in  1982 is the same as in the base case despite the 
fact that there were no  sales in  the  1979-81  period.  In  addition  to 
delaying the availability of medium-range wide-bodied jets, the absence 
of Airbus results in a higher market price. In the monopoly case, Boeing 
consistently sells the 767 for about 40 percent more than it would in 
the presence of Airbus competition. 
A comparison of this  scenario with  the base case shows that the 
primary  effect  of  the Airbus  subsidy is  redistributive.  The subsidy 
benefits all consumers  by several billions of 1974 dollars, hurts Boeing’s 
profits by several billion dollars, and costs European taxpayers about 
a billion and a half dollars. The net welfare effects are much smaller. 
On net, the subsidy is calculated to improve European welfare by about 
a billion  1974 dollars  (using the 5  percent social discount rate) and 
harms the United States by about a half billion dollars. The rest of the 
world, of course, gains due to lower prices. 
3.4.4  Allowing for Intertemporal Substitution 
The static demand scenario has some problems. Recall that our ex- 
amination of static models suggested that in the duopoly case the United 
States could  not  gain  if  it remained  a net exporter of aircraft. This 
suggests that the narrowness of the U.S. loss hinges crucially on the 
consumer gains during the first three years. As we have formulated the 
model, the availability of aircraft in  1979-81  provides large consumer 
benefits. This is  not  a plausible result. Could it  really  have  been  so 
important that wide-bodied jets be available in  1979 rather than  1982? 
In the standard learning curve models, demand is taken to be rep- 
resented by a relation between current price and current sales. Aircraft, 
however, are capital goods; there is therefore a possibility of intertem- 
poral substitution, with the consumer delaying purchase to wait for a 
lower price or availability of a better product. To take account of this 
possibility we run another-more  realistic-simulation,  assuming that 
all of the airlines that would have purchased in the 1979-81 period shift 
their demand to 1982. This simulation in effect increases the constant 
term in the 1982 demand function by a factor of 3. 
The middle part of table 3.4 presents the results of this simulation 
(intertemporal  demand substitution).  Note that, as  before, the principal 
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of consumers in  all regions, reduces the profits of Boeing, and costs 
European taxpayers approximately $1.5 billion. The difference in con- 
sumer surplus  with  and  without  Airbus  is  less drastic although  still 
substantial. On net, Europe loses (except for the low 3 percent discount 
rate), the United States loses, and the rest of the world gains. Europe 
is now calculated to have a consumer surplus gain due to Airbus, which 
is less than the cost of the subsidy by $37 million (for the 5 percent 
discount rate). For a 3 percent discount rate Europe gains on net from 
the competitive effect of Airbus by about a half billion dollars. For a 
10 percent discount rate, Europe’s net loss is almost $.9 billion. 
The simulation predicts that Airbus caused a net loss to the United 
States, but now the net loss is estimated at a much higher $3 billion. 
The difference lies partly in the fact that U.S. consumers do not gain 
as much by  the existence of Airbus, and partly in  the fact that the 
shifted demand increases the profitability of the Boeing monopoly. 
The basic conclusion from table 3.4 is that the subsidized entry of 
Airbus cost Europe something like $I .5 billion. This expenditure pro- 
vided large benefits to all consumers, but did substantial harm to Boeing’s 
profits.  Overall it seems that the A300 project  constituted a beggar- 
thy-neighbor and beggar-thyself policy for Europe. Allowing for inter- 
temporal substitution of demand, the United States suffered a loss in 
the sum of producer and consumer surplus for the social discount rates 
considered. The gain to Europe’s consumers outweighs the cost of the 
subsidy only for a discount rate of 3 percent. 
3.4.5  Sensitivity Analysis 
So far we have tested the sensitivity of our results only to the social 
discount rate. We  now turn to sensitivity analysis of the demand elas- 
ticity. The demand elasticity is crucial since it directly affects all three 
components of the welfare calculations. Consumer surplus obviously 
depends on it, as does the profitability of both Airbus and Boeing. This 
in turn affects our assessment of the size of the subsidy and Boeing’s 
profit loss. Moreover, it is neither estimated independently nor deduced 
directly from calibration. 
The case where E  = 1.57 seems a reasonable lower bound on the 
price elasticity. The calculated internal rate of  return on the A300 cor- 
responding to this figure is 3.544 percent-a  rather high figure. If  the 
demand for wide-bodied medium-range jets were even more inelastic, 
our simulation would come to the unreasonable result that the A300 
would have been undertaken even without government support. Like- 
wise, E  = 2.5 seems to be a reasonable  upper bound, since for this 
figure the simulation predicts that Boeing barely breaks even on the 
767, turning a profit of only $193 million. 70  Richard Baldwin/Paul Krugman 
Table 3.5  Sensitivity Analysis for Welfare Results 
Region 
Price  Demand  Social Discount 




-  E =  1.57  Intertemporal  3  + 
substitution  5  + 
10  + 
- 
- 






-  -  substitution  5 
10 
E = 2.5  lntertemporal  3 
substitution  5 
10 
-  - 
-  - 
-  - 
-  - 
Note: ROW = rest of  world 
Table 3.5 presents the sensitivity analysis on E. The table indicates 
the net welfare effect of the presence of Airbus for each of three elas- 
ticities. A positive sign indicates a net gain; a negative sign a net loss. 
As is evident, the subsidization of the A300 left the United States worse 
off for all values of E. Specifically, the loss in Boeing’s profits due to 
the A300 always exceeds the gain to  U.S.  consumers. Similarly, the 
welfare impact of the A300 on the rest of the world is unambiguous. 
This is of course expected since the rest of the world  neither earns 
profits nor pays the subsidy, leaving only the consumer surplus gain. 
The question of whether the A300 was a good idea for Europe turns 
out to be rather sensitive to the price elasticity. For relatively inelastic 
demand the cost of  the  subsidy  is  low  and the gains to European 
consumers are high. For the case of E  = 1.57 we estimate the subsidy 
cost as  a very low $301 million (using a social discount rate of 5 percent), 
while the European consumer gain is close to $2 billion.  By contrast, 
for E = 2.5 the subsidy is in the $2 billion range while Europe’s con- 
sumer gain is near $1 billion. 
3.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined international competition in wide- 
bodied aircraft. Given the degree of simplification necessary to  produce 
a tractable model, it is difficult to  base policy conclusions  on our results. 
What does emerge from the study is  the importance of consumers’ 
welfare in determining the desirability of strategic trade policy. This 
industry is marked by  a  large fixed-cost cum learning curve, which 
would appear to be a ready-made setup for strategic trade policy aimed 
at capturing pure rents. We  find, however, that for Europe as a whole 71  Industrial Policy and International Competition 
the welfare consequences of Airbus’s subsidized entry are dominated 
not  by  competition  over profits,  but  by  gains  in  consumer surplus 
resulting from earlier product introduction and increased competition. 
While there are many reasons to be skeptical of the precise  results, 
this chapter suggests an important lesson  for theoretical  1.0. trade 
models: models that, in the spirit of Brander and Spencer  (1981), neglect 
consumer effects of strategic trade policy, while useful for expositional 
purposes, are likely to be misleading when applied to real situations in 
which a sizable fraction of production goes to satisfy domestic demand. 
Second, this  chapter has  brought  out just how far from constant 
returns and perfect competition the industry is. While the aerospace 
industry appears highly concentrated even in aggregate statistics and 
is known to be subject to strong increasing returns, it is only when one 
examines competition at the level of specific products that the decisive 
role of dynamic economies of scale becomes apparent. The world mar- 
ket in no case supports more than two firms producing aircraft that are 
close substitutes in demand, and perhaps could only support one with- 
out government intervention.  Thus Boeing 747s have no close com- 
petitors; the A300 coexists with the 767 only because of government 
support; and when McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed developed sim- 
ilar craft, the DC-10 and the L-1011, both lost money. 
Finally, we should note as a caution that the analysis here focuses 
on the already existing competition in wide-bodied aircraft. This is not 
the whole story of the prospective competition. Airbus is about to start 
delivering the narrow-bodied  150-seat A320. The A320 is intended to 
meet a new niche (created by the deregulation of the U.S. air carrier 
industry) for smaller jets to  serve as feeders in  the hub-and-spoke 
routing system. Surrounding the A320 is a new set of strategic issues; 
both Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas have decided not to  challenge the 
A320 directly, but instead to try to leapfrog it by entering a few years 
later with an improved technology. It is the A320, not the A300, that 
is the focus of current trade tension. 
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Comment  Richard Harris 
This chapter is a nice mix of theory and empirical work, and represents 
the type of analysis we could use a great deal more of in international 
trade. The chapter draws on some of the authors’ earlier work applying 
the Spence oligopoly learning model to semiconductors. In this instance 
the application is to commercial wide-bodied aircraft, and in particular 
to the competition between Boeing and Airbus. It would be difficult to 
pick an industry for which this model is more appropriate; the industry 
is close to a pure duopoly, and the overwhelming significance of learning 
economies that are internal to the firm is well documented. 
The first part of the chapter lays out some simple issues of subsidy 
in static monopoly and oligopoly models. In the duopoly case the au- 
thors conclude that there is a welfare loss for the exporting country if 
entry into a duopoly is subsidized by the importing country. I have no 
quarrel with this conclusion in the particular model used, but would 
caution the reader that it is far from general. There are two potential 
problems, both having to do with the effect of entry deterrence. In the 
model, the incumbent exporting monopolist  has a clear incentive to 
deter entry. In the commercial aircraft industry the most likely vehicle 
for deterrence is up-front  investment in  research  and  development. 
R&D costs are a substantial portion of the total costs of any particular 
aircraft model. It is now well known that the existence of this incentive 
to invest for deterrence reasons can lead to overinvestment in  R&D. 
In this case the existence of a subsidized potential  entrant who can 
effectively enter with subsidy may reduce this overinvestment, which 
would  be  welfare-improving  for  the  country  in  which  the  over- 
investment initially occurred. On the other hand, if the initial situation 
were one in which entry-deterring investment was not occurring, then 
the introduction of a subsidized entrant might lead to inefficient R&D 
races. The net impact in this situation would depend crucially on how 
consumers gain relative to the inefficiency costs associated with R&D. 
On a related topic, the two simple models and the basic dynamic 
model used later in  the core of the chapter all assume that the costs 
and benefits of R&D are entirely internal to the firm. I believe this is 
a questionable empirical assumption; the existence of  spillovers be- 
tween firms in the R&D process can reverse many of the conventional 
conclusions. From the world’s point of view, and quite possibly from 
both countries’ point of view, the larger problem could be not enough 
investment in  R&D. It is difficult to balance this traditional  concern 
with issues of entry deterrence, but it is clearly important. 
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The main part of the chapter is concerned with a dynamic duopoly 
model with scale economies derived from a learning curve. It is worth 
noting two features of this model. First, the solution concept is one of 
“open loop” equilibrium; each firm takes the other firm’s entire future 
output sequence as given. The importance of this assumption is that 
it implies that an increase in output today by firm A will not increase 
market share of A in the future, even though learning induces lower 
marginal costs to A in the future. An alternative would be a “closed 
loop” equilibrium concept that would focus on cumulative outputs of 
the two firms as the natural state variables, and in addition would yield 
a subgame perfect equilibrium. I would guess that the equilibrium in 
this alternative model would yield  lower prices,  larger outputs, and 
greater consumer surplus because of the additional incentives for each 
firm to preempt future market share via current output decisions. The 
second feature of the model is that the marginal cost, which marginal 
revenue is anchored to, is a variant of “long-run”  marginal cost, that 
is, marginal cost after learning has ceased. In a model without  dis- 
counting, this is exactly true, but it is “approximately”  true even in 
this model. Thus because long-run marginal costs remain remarkably 
constant, so  do prices. This is evident in table 3.4,  where price  se- 
quences are given both before and after entry. Alternative equilibrium 
concepts might indeed change this result, and the higher the discount 
rate the more significant the difference might be. 
The empirical section of the chapter calibrates the model to a single 
year’s data. The authors choose as a free parameter the discount rate 
of Airbus. This parameter is chosen so as to equate the present value 
of the Airbus net revenue stream to zero. They then argue that because 
this rate is much lower than the discount rate used by Boeing, Airbus 
is “subsidized.”  It seems to me this is an inappropriate procedure for 
two reasons.  First, the welfare results of the model are crucially de- 
pendent on this calibration procedure. We  have no idea what the extent 
of any actual subsidy is, nor what is the sensitivity of the results to 
possible errors in estimating the extent of the subsidy. In the comput- 
able general equilibrium (CGE) literature a great deal of effort is put 
into getting estimates of all relevant policy variables. The calibration 
procedure of the CGE exercises is used only to scale constants and 
share parameters on utility and production functions. While subject to 
measurement  problems,  the  CGE procedure  does not  bury  key  as- 
sumptions regarding policy variables, which are themselves usually the 
focus of the analysis. In this model I think it is particularly unfortunate 
that the discount rate for Airbus was used as the free parameter. With 
learning effects there is at least  the potential  that  the discount rate 
could be the key structural parameter in determining the characteristics 
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subsidies does not  provide  a  rationale for discounting cash flows  at 
something different than the market rate if  profit maximization is the 
appropriate objective of the firm. In short, I  think it would be much 
better if  the authors used equal discount rates for both firms and in- 
troduced the subsidy quite explicitly. Clearly the form of the subsidy 
would affect the results. 
My last comment relates to the assumption in the chapter that Boeing 
is not subsidized. Non-U.S. observers would think this assumption a 
bit peculiar, particularly in the case of commercial aircraft. It is com- 
monly argued that the close association  of Boeing with the U.S.  defense 
establishment allows security of market size, together with long-term 
cross subsidization of R&D costs; both are obvious effective subsidies 
to commercial  aircraft  development. While  no one knows the true 
extent of such subsidies,  nor how they should be treated in international 
trade policy, as economists we should at least acknowledge that these 
features of the U.S.  market  could be a potentially  important deter- 
minant of international market structure in this and related industries. 
Comment  Catherine L. Mann 
Richard Baldwin and Paul Krugman’s chapter on evaluating the mag- 
nitude of the Airbus subsidy arrived on my desk almost concurrently 
with  a  news  clipping about the tough  stance U.S. trade negotiators 
were taking with the Europeans on the Airbus subsidy issue. Coming 
on the heels of the “luxury edibles” trade problem, I was certain that 
I would have to write a memo on the Airbus topic, detailing this most 
recent  trade skirmish between the United  States and the European 
Community  (EC). But, as events turned out, with  both Boeing  and 
McDonnell-Douglas backing off from their earlier pressure on the U .S. 
trade negotiators, I  didn’t need to write the memo. Nevertheless, I 
found Baldwin  and Krugman’s  essay quite topical  and a  refreshing 
departure from the majority of trade theory papers which only infre- 
quently address a real-world issue. 
Baldwin and Krugman use Airbus Industrie as an example of a high- 
technology industry with dramatic dynamic economies of scale. High 
fixed costs of introducing a new generation of aircraft combine with a 
significant learning curve in production  to lead to steeply downward 
sloped average cost curves for each family of aircraft. Such an industry 
structure can support only a few firms. Airbus Industrie, founded in 
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1970, is a consortium jointly owned by the governments of  France, 
Germany, Spain, and the United  Kingdom.  It joins Boeing and Mc- 
Donnell-Douglas as the major participants on the producer’s  side of 
the market for civilian aircraft. Lockheed departed the field in the late 
1970s. 
Baldwin and Krugman consider one mode of competition in demand 
for civilian aircraft, that between the Airbus A-300 and the Boeing 767. 
They argue that these models of aircraft are sufficiently different from 
other aircraft that they can model this competition as Cournot. Before 
Boeing introduced the 767, the A-300 had a monopoly over this market 
segment for wide-bodied jets. After introducing the 767, Boeing shared 
the market with the A-300 in a Cournot duopoly. 
Measuring  the welfare  consequences of  the competition  between 
Boeing and the A-300 involves, in part, weighing the gain to consumer 
surplus of moving from a monopoly to a duopoly against the loss to 
producer surplus (in this case, Boeing profits) from causing each pro- 
ducer to move back and up the production and learning curve for this 
generation of aircraft. Baldwin and Krugman estimate that the gain in 
consumer suiplus outweighs the loss in producer surplus, both overall 
and for all consuming groups (the EC, the United States, and the rest 
of the world). That Europe gains overall is striking because the gains 
are spread over all consumers while Europe alone incurs the subsidy 
necessary for Airbus to enter the airframe industry. 
How to measure this implied subsidy? Baldwin and Krugman choose 
to estimate the internal rate of return on the A-300. The subsidy is the 
difference between some measure of normal internal rate of return (set 
at 5 percent for the other participant, Boeing) and the internal rate of 
return that makes the present discounted value of Airbus’s net earnings 
on the A-300 just equal to zero. They estimate an internal rate of return 
of 0.75 percent. 
As an exercise in analyzing an industry characterized by dynamic 
scale economies, and one that exhibits imperfect competition and gov- 
ernment intervention, the aircraft industry is a terrific one to examine. 
However, since a main point of the chapter is to  estimate the magnitude 
of a particular subsidy, and the magnitude of the welfare consequences 
of such a departure from free trade, it is important to characterize the 
industry with  as much  specificity  as possible,  remaining within  the 
bounds of the parsimony required of international quantitative analysis. 
While  Baldwin  and Krugman have  done a  relatively  good job at 
introducing the important aspects of the production side of the aircraft 
industry, I think they need to do a better job on the demand side before 
we can pay too much attention to the estimates of the magnitude and 
welfare consequences of Airbus’s entry into the airframe industry.  I 
have some suggestions for a richer theoretical  formulation of  the de- 
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model. This model suggests that the lifetime of a generation of aircraft 
may be more related to characteristics of demand than to technological 
breakthroughs or to the useful life of the aircraft. Moreover, estimating 
the gains from subsidizing Airbus as the reduction in prices associated 
with increased competition fails to consider the technological exter- 
nalities accruing to Europe as farmland gives way to high-technology 
factories. On the production side, the learning curve occurs not only 
for a single generation, but for all generations. Finally, from a policy 
standpoint, it matters whether Airbus will eventually be profitable from 
this one-time infusion of capital or whether a per unit subsidy will  be 
necessary on all future production. 
Operationally, most of my comments can be handled through some 
sensitivity analysis on the three key parameters. In particular, I suggest 
that the elasticity of demand for a particular type of airframe is higher, 
that the Boeing internal rate of return is probably lower, and that the 
lifetime of  a generation may  be  shorter than  the parameter  values 
chosen by Baldwin and Krugman. 
Demanders of  airframes have a current and projected  set of “mis- 
sions” to which must be applied the existing fleet, new purchases, and 
purchases from or sales to the secondary market. It would seem that 
airframes, new and old, contain a vector of attributes designed to match 
the missions. Age, and the associated trade-off between airframe own- 
ership cost and airframe operating cost, is an obvious attribute. “Brand 
loyalty” remains an attribute from a maintenance standpoint, although 
in the new purchases market it apparently has been less important in 
recent  years.  Missions  can  change  over the forecast  period,  either 
because the specific demander’s operational characteristics change (a 
merger and change of  route structure) or because of  a more general 
shift in passenger travel preferences (shuttle flights between cities, or 
the opening up of certain parts of  the country because of  economic 
development there).  Because  aircraft can be  sold to the secondary 
market (or put back to the manufacturer via “walk-away’’ leases), the 
economic life of the airframe to a specific demander may be significantly 
different from its useful life. Moreover, sufficient change in the indus- 
try’s route structure (say, because of  the move from the direct flight 
concept to the hub-and-spoke concept) could lead to manufacturers 
experiencing a significantly different length for the product life-cycle 
than they had estimated. Finally, developers of airframes and demand- 
ers of airframes work together to design new aircraft. Thus, new pur- 
chases can be put off  until the desired product is ready. 
All these factors taken together suggest that it is not appropriate to 
model the A-300 and 767 as a monopoly-duopoly. First, these wide- 
bodied aircraft are direct competitors, but indirect competition created 
by  a  significant fringe of  other aircraft  types and  by  the secondary 
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and Krugman’s comparison simulation (used to measure the changes 
in welfare associated with the entry of Airbus), Boeing retains a mo- 
nopoly  because Airbus  does not  enter. We  do not  know  if  perhaps 
McDonnell-Douglas would  have entered the market for wide-bodied 
airframe if  Airbus had not. Therefore, I suggest that the parameter for 
the elasticity of demand is higher (more elastic) than that suggested in 
the chapter. At minimum, this parameter should receive a fair amount 
of sensitivity testing. In fact, Baldwin and Krugman note that aircraft 
are capital goods and that because this aspect is not included  in the 
model, their simulation results unfortunately show that the price of the 
A-300  is  “too  high”  in  the part of  the life  cycle where it  has the 
monopoly in the base case simulation. 
Baldwin and Krugman estimate the magnitude of the subsidy in part 
by comparing the internal rate of return for Airbus with that of Boeing. 
Aircraft are not produced in single generations by a new start-up each 
time. Airbus Industrie may eventually reach a more reasonable rate of 
return after it has been in business for the forty-odd years of Boeing. 
Moreover,  while  it appears clear that the consortium’s governments 
have subsidized Airbus, the relationship between the defense estab- 
lishment  in  the  United  States and the airframe  manufacturers here 
suggests implied subsidies to their operations as well.  Whether those 
subsidies  are contained  in  Baldwin  and  Krugman’s  estimate of  a  5 
percent internal rate of  return for Boeing is unclear. (In fact, Europe’s 
threat to examine just this question might have led to Boeing’s quieting 
its demands for a deeper investigation of the Airbus subsidy.) One could 
argue that even if  the subsidy to Airbus were not outweighed by the 
consumer gains as measured  here, there are clear technological (and 
defense) externalities gained by the birth of Airbus Industrie. 
Policy considerations suggest examining in greater detail the char- 
acteristics of the subsidy. A subsidy to entry followed by competitive 
operations has different policy implications than one where the entrant 
is never competitive. The Baldwin and Krugman estimate suggests that 
production costs for the A-300 ran about 20 percent higher than those 
for the 767. Is this a long-run equilibrium difference in production costs 
caused by having factories  spread all over Europe? Will Airbus have 
to subsidize each airframe design because Airbus chooses to compete 
against both Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas at different points in the 
product spectrum, a competition that we are starting to observe in the 
next generation airframe in the various families? Or does this subsidy 
represent the one-time cost of gaining credibility for a new airframe 
producer? I’m not sure that the model currently formulated can handle 
a question of this type, but as Baldwin and Krugman note, the action 
in  the political  arena is no longer about the A-300 but  is about the 
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